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Recent studies have concluded that most mergers and acquisitions (M&As) reduce rather
than increase shareholder value for the acquiring firm, but understanding of why this
occurs is limited. To date, most research has focused on issues of strategic fit, whereas
this study examines the effects of organizational fit—specifically the effects of
differences in firms’ pre-M&A configurations of espoused values in regards to relation-
ships with employees versus production. The dependent variable of interest is the result-
ing entities’ subsequent financial performance (return on assets, adjusted for industry).
The study analyzed 59 M&As between 1989 and 1996. The authors measured the
espoused values of both firms in the transaction by content analyzing presidents’letters to
shareholders in corporate annual reports. Using a longitudinal design, results show an
inverse relationship between differences in espoused values and postmerger perfor-
mance. Results and methodology are discussed in terms of their application beyond the
M&A context.
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The past decade has seen a tremendous burgeoning of merger and acquisition (M&A)
activity. The dollar value of M&A deals leaped more than 120% between 1990 and
1999 (Kaplan, 2001). However, it has also been reported that between 60% and 70% of
such transactions failed to deliver the promised increases in shareholder value, and
indeed only 30% of deals resulted in any creation of shareholder value (Gunders &
Alpert, 2001; KPMG, 2001b). This suggests a cruel scenario, not only for sharehold-
ers but also for the employees and managers who undergo wrenching changes in work
roles, task environments, and chains of command. For the majority of stakeholders,
this scenario involves pain for little or no gain.
At the same time that these changes are occurring, our understanding of the factors
that drive postmerger performance is limited. As Hitt, Ireland, and Harrison (2001)
point out, there is much unexplained variance in the performance of M&As. Although
strategic fit is clearly required for superior performance in a merger or acquisition, it
alone is insufficient in explaining much of the variance. Given that so many deals have
tended not to perform as expected, researchers’ attention—which initially focused on
issues of strategic fit—has shifted in the past decade to issues of organizational fit.
ESPOUSED VALUES
In this study, we examine the effects of differences in the espoused values of the
firms involved in a merger or acquisition transaction. We need to clarify what we mean
here by firms’espoused values. Espoused values are those values that are expressed on
behalf of the organization or attributed to an organization by its senior managers in
public statements such as in the firms’ annual reports. Therefore, espoused values are
different from what some have termed organizational values (e.g., Rousseau, 1990),
that is, values that are shared by all or a large proportion of an organization’s members.
Espoused values are distinct, too, from values that are treated as a proxy for organiza-
tional practices (e.g., Trice & Beyer, 1993). The distinction parallels the one drawn by
Argyris and Schon (1978) between espoused and enacted values. Unlike Argyris and
Schon, however, our use of the term espoused does not imply we view espoused values
as ephemeral or an epiphenomenon. Espoused values can, in some cases at least,
reflect differences in organizational practices and strategies. In many cases, they may
reflect what senior managers actually believe their organizations to be like, what they
would like or prefer their organizations to be like, or how they would like their organi-
zations to be perceived by significant stakeholders (cf. Kabanoff & Daly, 2002). Our
point is that irrespective of whether a firm’s espoused values reflect its actual (i.e.,
enacted) values, values its top managers aspire to, or values it simply projects, firms
We are grateful to the National Science Foundation, Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sci-
ences, Program for Innovation and Organizational Change, which provided the financial support for this
study. An earlier version of the article was presented at the 2002 Academy of Management Meetings, Denver,
Colorado.
Joseph P. Daly is a professor of management, Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University,
Boone, North Carolina.
Richard W. Pouder is an associate professor of management, Walker College of Business, Appalachian State
University, Boone, North Carolina.
Boris Kabanoff is a professor and director of research and development, Faculty of Business and Australian
Centre for Business Research, Queensland University of Technology, Queensland, Australia.
that differ in the values they espouse are different in an important and significant way
that has implications for their mutual fit in M&A situations. The challenge of estab-
lishing precisely what differences in organizations’ espoused values imply for other
aspects of organizational practices, strategies, or beliefs is similar to that faced by
researchers into organizational identity (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000), and the
present study can be seen as an initial exploration of the consequences of differences in
espoused values in an M&A context.
The study examines differences in organizations’ espousal of two broad value
dimensions: concern for employees and concern for production. This “task versus per-
son” distinction can be seen as one of the seminal and most consistently identified con-
trasts in the broad field of organizational behavior (Polley, 1987). It is discussed in a
variety of contexts, including the analysis of role structure in groups (Bales, 1955),
contingency models of leadership (e.g., Fiedler, 1967; Yukl, 1981), organizational the-
ory (Emery & Trist, 1969; Katz & Kahn, 1978), frameworks of organizational culture
(see Cameron & Quinn, 2000; O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991; Sheridan,
1992), and top management team culture (Klimoski & Koles, 2001).
As shown in Figure 1, the value typology we employ describes four combinations
of these two dimensions:
1. concern for both production and employees is low,
2. concern for both is high,
3. concern for production is high and concern for employees is low, and
4. concern for employees is high and concern for production is low.
Value Structures or Configurations
Both Rokeach (1979) and Schwartz (1992) emphasize that values should be classi-
fied because those holding values, whether people or institutions, can be distinguished
from other people or institutions in terms of the importance that they place on individ-
ual values in the context of a larger set. The pattern of relationships between values in a
larger set may be called a value structure or value profile. Thus, in examining value
profiles with regard to espoused organizational values in this study, we are taking a
configurational approach (Doty & Glick, 1994; Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993), which
means that we will not be looking at values individually but rather in the combinations
specified earlier. As Kabanoff and Daly (2000) put it, comparing values in the context
of profiles or structures “is theoretically both more parsimonious and more satisfying,
complex or rich” (p. 287). Indeed, most models of values in the organizational context
use a configurational approach (Trice & Beyer, 1993).
Using Content Analysis to Measure Values
Rokeach (1979) argues that individuals and organizations leave traces or patterns
of values in the documents that they produce, and such traces are observable and mea-
surable. Values themselves are unobservable (Rousseau, 1990), but documents are
artifacts, which are observable, and their content, specifically their text content, can
provide indications of a person’s or organization’s espoused values.
The present study looks at the impact of initial differences in espoused organiza-
tional values—differences between the values of the acquiring organization and those
of the target organization—on organizational performance following a related acqui-
sition. We employ a longitudinal design using archival data sources. Specifically, we
use computer-assisted text analysis (CATA)—more commonly known as content
analysis—of presidents’ letters in annual reports to derive our measure of the values in
question. We also use accounting data to measure performance. The use of accounting
data enables us to control for biases in self-assessed performance as well as important
influences on performance in this context, such as acquisition experience, industry
effects, and relatedness.
Content analysis is typically done manually but is more often also being done with
the aid of computers. This involves devising a dictionary of categories that serve as
variables in some later statistical analysis. The dictionary contains “tags” or words and
phrases that are viewed as instances of those categories. The computer program then
tallies up the frequency with which those tags appear in a given document. The fre-
quency of occurrence is viewed as indicative of what communicators emphasize in the
document—in short, the communicators’ values. Content analysis has been used in
this manner to measure values since the pioneering work of Lasswell, Lerner, and de
Sola Pool (1952). Unlike Lasswell et al., however, we use computers to conduct the
content analysis, effectively eliminating biases that might be introduced by the use of
multiple human raters.
Content analysis of organizational documents has been described as having a great
deal of potential for research on organizations (Kabanoff, 1996). As mentioned previ-
ously, the documents we analyze are presidents’ letters in companies’ annual reports.
The letter is a public document, is produced at regular intervals that are consistent
across firms, and, for purposes of longitudinal analysis, is available for many public
companies going back an appreciable length of time. Once published and recorded
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the document cannot be altered in
hindsight. Biases of self-selection do not arise, and by using documents that were pro-
duced prior to an M&A event, biases of retrospection are not a factor. Finally, the data-
gathering process is nonreactive (i.e., unobtrusive), minimizing the degree to which
the process of measurement may alter the phenomenon under study (see Webb,
Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 1966).
Two questions still remain about using presidents’ letters to try to capture values
that are espoused by organizations’ “top teams.” The first is, How involved are senior
managers in deciding on the content of such letters? The second is, To what extent is
the content expressed in the letter associated with actual organizational outcomes and
behaviors?
The information we obtained from presidents’ letters can be traced primarily to the
CEO of each firm, who generally takes a lead role in outlining the contents of the
annual report, proofreading it, and changing it (Bowman, 1984; Thomas, 1997).
Often, although not invariably, the CEO discusses the content with other senior man-
agers or obtains their views in other ways so that the final content reflects a set of
shared views that are broadly reflective of the senior management group. The CEO
signs the letter and is held accountable for its contents in a legal sense by the Securities
and Exchange Commission and in a social sense by multiple constituencies (Wolfe,
1991).
A number of studies have shown the predictive validity of CATA using annual
reports with regard to important outcomes. Abrahamson and Amir (1996) found that
investors regarded those textual portions as an important source of investment infor-
mation. Other studies using content analysis of annual reports in general and presi-
dents’ letters in particular have shown the categories produced by such analyses to be
predictive of outcomes, such as the survival of the firm (D’Aveni & Macmillan, 1990;
Tennyson, Ingram, & Dugan, 1990), successful versus unsuccessful downsizing
(Kabanoff, Palmer, & Brown, 2002), propensity for risk (Bowman, 1984), and corpo-
rate performance in general (Kohut & Segars, 1992; Swales, 1988). With regard to
espoused values specifically, Kabanoff and Holt (1996) content analyzed annual
reports and found that expressions of such values are quite stable, at least over rela-
tively short time periods of 5 to 6 years. Kabanoff and Daly (2000) found that a com-
parison of espoused values as measured by content analysis across a sample of Austra-
lian and U.S. firms supported their hypotheses about value differences between the
two countries.
DIFFERENCES IN VALUES
AND POST-M&A PERFORMANCE
Research in strategic management has shown that a key component of implement-
ing M&A strategies is organizational fit (Datta, 1991; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999).
The potential of M&As for creating shareholder value often is not realized because of
difficulties in integrating the two organizations (see Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988),
especially when the process involves related diversification (Haspeslagh & Jemison,
1991). Indeed, a survey of more than 200 European CEOs showed that the ability to
integrate the new company rated as the most important factor for acquisition success
(Cartwright & Cooper, 1993).
Most of the research on organizational fit as a factor in predicting performance of
merged firms has focused on three dimensions: organizational resistance (Buono &
Bowditch, 1989; Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991), accultura-
tion processes (Elsass & Veiga, 1994; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988), and cultural
compatibility (Buono, Bowditch, & Lewis, 1985; Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Datta,
1991). The organizational fit literature highlights the effects of incompatibilities
between firms.
We expect that differences in values across the two organizations involved in a
merger or acquisition will have negative consequences for the performance of the
resultant organization because the task of integration is likely to be more difficult
and ultimately may be less successful in those instances. In turn, as Klimoski and
Mohammed (1994) argue, the lack of shared values or assumptions in a collectivity is
likely to negatively affect the speed of implementation of decisions, to inhibit problem
solving and coordinated action, and to hamper learning. With respect to values specifi-
cally, a considerable body of research on the group level shows that value consensus
enhances whereas important value differences detract from such performance (for a
review and extension, see Jehn & Mannix, 2001). Thus, to the extent that individuals in
an acquired organization feel that their values are widely different from those of their
new “partners,” those people are more likely to leave the organization, taking valuable
knowledge with them. These individuals may be top executives of the acquired firm
(Buchholtz, Ribbens, & Houle, 2003; Cannella & Hambrick, 1993), or they may sim-
ply be valued employees. As an example of what can happen when values turn out to
be relatively similar, there was much speculation preceding IBM’s Lotus acquisition
that Ray Ozzie, who conceived the centerpiece-product Lotus Notes, would resign
rather than see his organization become part of IBM. At the time, Ozzie was described
as “one of the most brilliant programmers in the world” (Kirkpatrick, 1996, p. 62).
Ozzie did not resign, and as a likely opinion leader within Lotus, his decision may have
convinced others to stay as well. On the whole, the acquisition of Lotus can be counted
as a financial success. Sales of Lotus Notes rose almost 60% in the year following the
acquisition, to more than $650 million (Judge, 1997).
Thus, the integration process following a related merger or acquisition is likely to
go more smoothly to the extent that members of the acquirer and target see “eye to eye”
regarding which values are important in the conduct of the organization, given that the
relative emphasis between concern for employees and concern for production is such
a fundamental issue. In this context, a smoother integration process will likely result in
a higher level of postmerger organizational performance.
METHOD
Sample
The sample of firms was drawn from the list of M&As published in the Journal of
Mergers and Acquisitions during the years 1989 through 1996. Firms selected met
the following criteria: (a) Both firms were publicly traded to ensure the potential avail-
ability of annual reports and financial performance data; (b) the merger or acquisition
was between firms classified as competing in related businesses, because when the
businesses of acquired and target firms are similar, both entities will interact more
frequently than when the businesses of acquired and target firms are dissimilar
(Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997); (c) both firms were independent entities at the time
of the acquisition; and (d) the acquirer had not been involved in another merger or
acquisition for the 3 years prior to the year of the acquisition and the 3 years after the
year of the acquisition. The latter two criteria ensured a more precise measure of the
effects of the acquisition by avoiding the confounding influences of other acquisitions
(Lubatkin, 1987; Ramaswamy, 1997), whereas a postmerger period of 3 years allowed
for assimilation of the merged entities. Although a longer time period following the
merger or acquisition may have more accurately captured the desired effects, we found
that a substantial number of firms in the sample had made additional mergers or acqui-
sitions shortly after the 3-year window. Overall, 115 companies met these criteria. Of
these, our final sample consisted of the 59 firms (initially, pairs of firms) for which
there were complete data to conduct the analysis. Although this is a relatively small
sample, it has the advantage of meeting rigorous selection criteria, which should help
to minimize the influence of factors unrelated to the actual M&A events being studied.
Data and Measures
Main independent variable. Because the derivation of the major independent vari-
able in this study—the difference in firms’initial espoused values—involved a number
of steps, we provide here an overview of the process involved. In the appendix, we
offer a more detailed description of how the difference score was derived.
The two main value themes we assessed were concern for employees and concern
for production. Two variables relating to concern for employees were extracted. These
were affiliation (or the use of “warmth” words in each document) and employee focus
(the number of references to employees). Similarly, two variables relating to concern
for production were extracted: references to goals and references to performance (for a
brief description of the content of these categories, see Table 1). We obtained these
value measures using computer-assisted content analysis, which counted the fre-
quency with which terms relating to these two dimensions occurred in the presidents’
letters in the annual reports of acquiring and target firms for the 3 years before the
merger.
We then constructed a difference score across each acquirer-target pair in their
espousals of these two themes as follows. Having obtained counts of the words and
phrases relating to our four content categories, we used these four scores in a cluster
analysis to categorize firms—separately for acquirers and targets—into one of the four
possible value groupings or “types” shown in Figure 1.
We used all four measures; we did not combine the two concern for employees
measures nor did we combine the two concern for production measures, because the
process of combining variables would have reduced the amount of information that
was available to the cluster routine for classifying organizations into the different
value groupings. We then assigned a difference score to each acquirer-target pair,
which reflected the number of differences in their espoused themes according to the
group or type they had been assigned to. Each difference score could take one of three
values based on the number of themes on which a pair of organizations varied: 0, for no
TABLE 1
Dictionary of Content Analysis Categories in the Study
Category Definition and Examples
Affiliation Concern with interpersonal warmth and solidarity: admire, affection, confidence
Employee focus Concern for employees of the organization (nonmanagerial): employee, staff,
worker, associate
Goals Concern for end states: benchmark, target, projection, aim
Performance Concern with performance and outcomes: perform, productivity, achieve, results
NOTE: Affiliation terms come from the Harvard IV Dictionary (Stone, Dunphy, Smith, & Ogilvie, 1966).
Remaining entries written by Kabanoff, Waldersee, and Cohen (1995).
differences between acquirer and target across the four value categories (i.e., both had
been assigned to the same value type); 2, for two differences (i.e., they were similar on
two of the content categories and different on two); or 4, for four differences (i.e., the
firms differed in directionality of emphasis—positive or negative—on all four
themes). A summary of the method used to construct the difference scores can be
found in Figure 2. The difference variable was therefore an index of correspondence
between the espoused value profile of the acquirer and that of the target. The variable
describes the number of value categories that were given a different emphasis across
the two firms. It is an ordinal-level measure with a range of 0 to 4. For a more detailed
description of the process used to derive the independent variable, see the appendix.
Dependent variable. Acquisition performance, our dependent variable, was mea-
sured following the procedure specified in Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999). We
derived acquisition performance as the revenue-weighted, industry-adjusted differ-
ence between ex ante and ex post profitability, measured as return on assets (ROA) for
the 3 years preceding and following the year of the acquisition. We corrected for indus-
try influence for targets and acquirers at the four-digit Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (SIC) level by subtracting the median industry ROA from firm-level ROA. Perfor-
mance data were obtained from COMPUSTAT.
Control Variables
Relatedness of target and acquirer. We read articles on all M&As in the business
press and classified each as related or unrelated. However, the degree of relatedness
and, thus, interaction between target and acquirer can be expected to vary. Following
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), we developed a continuous measure of relatedness
based on a weighting scheme in which matches of target and acquirer were evaluated
at each digit level of the four-digit SIC codes across the firms’businesses. Data on SIC
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codes in target and acquiring firms were obtained from COMPUSTAT and Compact
Disclosure.
Prior acquisition experience. Although our sample includes only acquiring firms
that made no acquisitions in the 3-year period preceding the focal acquisition, previ-
ous research shows that performance is influenced by prior acquisition experience
(Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Haleblian & Finkelstein,
1999; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). We controlled for acquisition experience
because the majority of acquiring firms in the sample had made at least one acquisition
prior to the 3-year window. We measured acquisition experience as the total number of
acquisitions made by the acquirer in the 10-year period preceding the 3-year pre-
acquisition time period. Data were collected from the Journal of Mergers and Acquisi-
tions, Moody’s Industrial Manual, and the LexisNexis mergers and acquisition
database.
Content analysis of text in president’s letter
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Relative acquisition size. The ratio of target to acquirer size may be positively
related to the inability of the acquirer’s management to grasp the complexities of
postmerger integration, yet negatively related to the attention that the target receives
from the acquirer (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992). Such factors can
negatively affect the performance potential of the merger by inhibiting postmerger
integration. Indeed, researchers have shown that size differences between the acquir-
ing and target firm may have a direct influence on financial performance (Datta, Grant,
& Rajagopalan, 1991; Kitching, 1967; Kusewitt, 1985). We controlled for relative
acquisition size using the ratio of target assets to acquirer assets. Data were collected
from COMPUSTAT.
Acquirer slack. Slack resources provide available capital that may be used to fund
projects (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989) and create incentives for managers to initiate
projects related to firm growth (Jensen, 1987), such as the ongoing integration of
merged firms. Slack may directly influence acquisition performance by reducing the
need for costly debt financing. We measured slack as the acquiring firm’s industry-
adjusted debt-to-equity ratio, which was obtained from COMPUSTAT.
Preacquisition performance. Following Ramaswamy (1997) and Haleblian and
Finkelstein (1999), we used preacquisition performance (defined above) to control for
two potential problems when change scores are used. As Ramaswamy notes, firms that
performed well prior to a merger
might not be able to improve their performance as much as the low performers simply because their
base rate of performance was higher. [In addition] the pre-change value is invariably correlated with
the post-change value. Therefore, using the magnitude of change as the dependent variable could
lead to spurious effects if the model does not account for the ex ante effect. (p. 706)
RESULTS
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for all the variables.
The data were tested for multicollinearity to determine whether a variable contributed
substantially to the variance of one or more other variables, particularly between pre-
acquisition performance and change in performance following the acquisition. No sig-
nificant multicollinearity was detected among the variables. Note that the zero-order
correlation between the independent variable and the dependent variable is –.38 (p <
.01), which is consistent with our prediction.
Main Effects of Value Configurations
Although the main effects of cluster membership are not of central concern to our
hypothesis, we analyzed them to make sure that they could not be posed as alternative
explanations for our results. For example, a high concern for employees–high concern
for production combination could be viewed as an indicator of a high-performing
value profile (cf. Blake & Mouton, 1964).
We therefore set out to test for the existence of a main effect of cluster group mem-
bership using regression. However, when we entered group membership variables as a
block, the model did not explain a significant amount of variance in organizational
performance, R2 = .051, F(3, 55) = 0.993, ns. We therefore did not pursue any further
investigations into a possible main effect of the value configurations studied here,
focusing instead on the effects of differences in values between acquirer and target.
Qualitative Analysis of Portions of Text
An important aspect of the content analysis procedure is to investigate the passages
of text that the computer has counted as reflecting different content themes to make
sure that the selected portions relate to the themes we desire to measure. We read
through all of the selected text as a check on the validity of the computer analysis. A
sample of the kinds of passages extracted, relevant to the configurations of values stud-
ied and the difference score measure that was our independent variable, is given in
Table 3. Table 3 presents examples of passages taken from acquirer-target pairs that
are sorted according to three possible combinations: (a) both firms were classified as
having the same espoused value profile (i.e., assigned a difference score of 0), (b) the
two firms share the same emphasis on two value categories but differ on two others
(a difference score of 2), and (c) the two firms share no similarity of emphasis across
the four value categories (a difference score of 4).
Analysis of the Effects of Acquirer-Target
Differences in Initial Values
Hierarchical regression analysis was used to analyze the data so that the effects of
the control variables could be separated from those of differences in values. The re-
gression results presented in Table 4 show the influence of differences in values. The
results show strong support for our prediction that there would be an inverse relation-
ship between those differences and performance following the acquisition. They pro-
vide evidence that similarities in initial value profiles between target and acquirer have
TABLE 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (N = 59)
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Prior acquisition experiencea 1.53 0.94
2. Relatedness of target and acquirer 4.27 2.14 –.06
3. Relative acquisition size 0.54 0.59 –.23 –.09
4. Preacquisition performancea 1.92 0.71 –.12 .15 –.21
5. Acquirer slacka 1.55 0.37 .02 –.05 .22 –.17
6. Espoused values difference score 2.07 1.53 –.13 .08 –.15 –.07 –.24
7. Acquisition performance –1.26 3.41 .24 –.10 .12 –.14 .09 –.38
NOTE: Correlations with an absolute value greater than .36 are significant at the .01 level
a. Logarithm.
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a positive influence on performance following the acquisition. Model 1 showed that
the influence of control variables was not significant, explaining 10% of the variance.
Prior acquisition experience was only marginally significant (p < .10). Model 2 was
significant in explaining 21% of the variance in performance change following the
acquisition (p < .05). The differences in initial values explained 11% of this variance.
DISCUSSION
Our study represents an important contribution to an understudied area, namely the
effect of differences in espoused organizational values between acquirer and target top
management teams on their successful integration into a new organization. Given that
most transactions are pursued to achieve strategic fit, and that a growing number of
surveys of top management have found that the challenge of integrating the target firm
rivals strategic considerations in importance (e.g., Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, Inc., as
cited in Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Corporate Strategy Board, 2002; KPMG, 2001a),
further research into the effects of factors beyond strategic fit that influence the out-
comes of M&As continues to be important.
Specific cluster memberships in our study showed no significant effects; however,
the effects of differences in membership across partners in a given merger or acqui-
sition were significant. Thus, our results corroborate Ensley and Pearce’s (2001)
conclusion, drawn on a sample of new-venture top management teams, that the pro-
cess of developing shared understandings—here, the result of the integration of two
TABLE 4
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Differences in Espoused Values
and Change in Performance Following Acquisitions (N = 59)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Control variables
Prior acquisition experiencea .27* .21
Relatedness of target and acquirer –.06 –.04
Relative acquisition size .15 .09
Preacquisition performancea –.06 –.12
Acquirer slacka .04 –.04
Independent variable
Espoused values difference score –.35***
Model R2 .10 .21
∆R2 .11
F 1.20 2.23**
NOTE: Standardized coefficients are reported.
a. Logarithm.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
organizations—was more predictive of outcomes than was the content of individual
understandings.
There are a number of advantages to our design. Our design used archival data and
was longitudinal in nature. Our measure of organizational values came from content
analysis of presidents’ letters, an innovative data source that is unobtrusive and avoids
biases of self-selection, retrospection, and the Hawthorne effect. Finally, we con-
trolled for important sources of potential contamination in the study. Despite these
strengths, we recommend that other researchers pursue the same question using other
methodologies (such as the survey method), so that the strengths in each method (e.g.,
the directness of the survey method and the lack of reactivity and retrospective biases
in content analysis) can offset weaknesses in the other.
Interestingly, none of the other variables measured besides differences in initial
values were found to be significant. For example, the p level for the effect of acqui-
sition experience was .122. That is likely due to the fact that any acquirers that had
been involved in an acquisition during the 3 years prior to the focal acquisition were
excluded from the sample to avoid contamination from the integration of other targets,
thus restricting the range of the acquisition experience variable.
Another reason some of the control variables did not show a significant effect may
be because of our somewhat low N of 59 cases. As noted previously, the sample size
was not larger because, in the interests of controlling for contaminating effects, we
excluded acquirers that had multiple, major acquisitions within the 3-year pretrans-
action window. Parenthetically, that result speaks to the fact that many acquirers in the
past 15 years have been on “binges,” acquiring multiple firms in fairly rapid succes-
sion. One possible way that researchers might address this issue of a low N is to extend
the time frame over which firms are sampled. To the extent that our N is low, the pres-
ent study represents a conservative test of our prediction.
We see our use of presidents’ letters as the source of data on espoused values to be a
strength, for the reasons enumerated above. We have previously acknowledged that
some may criticize the use of presidents’ letters on the grounds that annual reports
do not present the organization as it is but rather as its managers wish it to appear.
Although we accept that we still need to establish the precise nature of the constructs
underlying content measures of the type we have used here, our findings arguably add
weight to the view that such variables are tapping into constructs that have real impli-
cations for organizations, rather than being “mere public relations fluff.”
Rousseau (1990) has argued that culture is a many-layered construct with funda-
mental assumptions at the deepest level and that documents as artifacts can represent
expressions of those assumptions on the surface. Content analysis was used in our
study to measure such “traces” of assumptions, both conscious and unconscious, in
documents. Content analysis measures a form of behavior, that is, communication
behavior. Our analysis includes making inferences by what organizations do not talk
about as well as by what they do mention. The notion that organizations may em-
phasize one set of stakeholders’ interests over another, as a fundamental aspect of
organizational functioning, is captured in Keeley’s (1988) social-contract theory of
organizations.
Directions for Future Research
Certainly, more research is needed to corroborate our findings. One possible ave-
nue for future research would be to obtain documents beyond the presidents’ letters.
Ideally, these would be internal documents that are, of course, more difficult to obtain
than are public documents. A further disadvantage of internal documents that should
be taken into account is that they are not produced at regular intervals in a standard
format as are annual reports.
A number of avenues for further research using the CATA method described here
are worth considering. Although Kabanoff and Holt (1996) demonstrated that es-
poused values seem to be moderately stable over a short period, both the consequences
and causes of changes in espoused values over a longer time frame have yet to be stud-
ied. Can we find evidence that the relative stability of such values is related to superior
performance, perhaps due to the existence of a strong, stable culture (cf. Gordon &
DiTomaso, 1992; Kotter & Heskett, 1992)? Or is change in espoused values more
likely to be associated with improved performance, indicating the presence of a
more dynamic, adaptive value framework (Denison & Mishra, 1995)? Considering
the causes of changes in espoused values, what is the effect on espoused values of a
new CEO taking the helm at a firm, particularly if it is possible to measure the CEO’s
espoused values prior to joining the organization? To the extent that the CEO’s a priori
values are different from those that prevail in the organization, what is the impact on
both espoused organizational values and organizational performance?
Much remains to be done in coming to an understanding of the factors that explain
successful integration in M&As. Content analysis presents us with a powerful tool
in furthering our understanding of this context. It may be valuable for researchers
because it enables them to assess the issue of value similarity in a quantitative and
nonreactive fashion that is not reliant on direct access, and it makes use of archival data
that allow for longitudinal analysis. Considering the level of debate about both the
financial and human consequences of M&A activity, a method that increases our abil-
ity to study it more effectively surely deserves serious consideration.
APPENDIX
Detailed Description of How the Difference Score Was Derived
Standardizing the Frequency Counts
Presidents’ letters in annual reports were the data source for our text analysis of espoused
values. Such letters often differ in length considerably across firms. To compensate for such dif-
ferences, we took the counts for each of the four values categories—affiliation, references to
employees, references to goals, and references to performance—and divided them first by the
number of sentences of text in each window (i.e., each year preacquisition for which there was
a president’s letter) and second across the three windows. Differences in the availability of
text across firms were further dealt with by computing standard (z) scores for each variable.
These z scores, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of ±1, were then used in all subsequent
analyses.
Cluster Analysis
K-means cluster analysis (MacQueen, 1967) was used to classify firms. Configurations for
the two dimensions in the study were created by inserting “seed points” or initial cluster centers
for all four variables describing the four cluster profiles in Figure 1. For variables that were
expected to be emphasized in a given combination, we used a seed point of 1 or 1 standard devia-
tion above the mean among these standardized variables (recall that all scores were now z scores
with a standard deviation of ±1). Where a variable was expected to be deemphasized, a seed
point of –1 (1 standard deviation below the mean) was used.
As would be hoped, for variables that are meant to be measuring the same value theme, the
two variables measuring concern for employees were positively correlated (r = .80, p < .01, for
the acquirer subsample; r = .69, p < .01, for the targets). A similar, if weaker, pattern held for the
two variables that indexed concern for performance (r = .26, p < .05, for the acquirers; r = .24, p <
.05, for the targets). In turn, the average correlation between theoretically “unrelated” content
categories was small (average r = .07). However, rather than averaging across the two pairs mea-
suring each value theme for the purposes of clustering, we retained all four content categories
because the averaging process would have reduced the amount of information that was available
to the cluster routine for allocating organizations to different value profiles. Because organiza-
tions can use different terms to espouse the same value theme, we deemed it appropriate to use
the more detailed, word-count data rather than averaging. Four theoretical profiles were thereby
generated using the four variables:
1. low on both dimensions (seed points of –1 –1 –1 –1),
2. high on concern for employees and low on concern for production (1 1 –1 –1),
3. low on concern for employees and high on concern for production (–1 –1 1 1), and
4. high on both dimensions (1 1 1 1).
The acquirer and target firms were categorized separately using cluster analysis, producing a
split-sample analysis as recommended by Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998). The value
profiles of the four clusters that appeared for both groups were quite similar, giving us confidence
that the two sets of organizations were comparable in terms of their espoused value profiles.
Assigning Difference Scores
The actual difference scores were computed by comparing the cluster membership of the
acquirer with that of the target and assigning a number based on the number of variables in the
comparison that bore different signs across the two firms. Thus, as mentioned above, if both
firms were in the same cluster, the difference score was 0. If the two shared two final cluster cen-
ters with the same sign, the difference score was 2. Finally, if the comparison of the final cluster
centers for the two firms showed no overlap in the direction (plus or minus) of those cluster cen-
ters, a score of 4 was assigned to that pairing.
Further Validation of the Cluster Analysis Solutions
Ketchen and Shook (1996) criticize prevailing uses of cluster analysis, including failure to
validate the solution. We note that most of their criticisms were specifically directed at inductive
clustering, as opposed to the kind of deductive, theory-based analyses we have done here. Panj
and Stewart (1983, p. 146) recommend a split-half procedure for cross-validating a cluster solu-
tion. Following this procedure, the sample of acquirers was split in half, and the cluster analysis
was run on both halves independently The two solutions were then compared. The results can be
seen in Table A1. Using this test, both halves of each subsample showed a similar solution, dem-
onstrating external validity.
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